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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
PUBLIC LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION: LAW AND PROCEDURE
Melvin G. Dakin*
Civil Service Commissions
The civil service article of the Louisiana Constitution in-
cludes a provision authorizing a civil service commission to
"reinstate employees under such conditions as it deems proper
and may order full pay for lost time."' Under this conditioning
power, the commission practice developed of deducting from
back pay wages earned in private employment by an employee
during the time he was separated from the service, if the com-
mission found that he had been illegally separated and had
ordered reinstatement with back pay.2 However, this discre-
tionary power was deemed to extend only to cases in which
the commission itself reinstated the employee.8 If the reinstate-
ment was the result of a judicial appeal a court was deemed
powerless to deduct wages earned by plaintiff during illegal
separation from service presumably on the theory that the court
did not share the commission's power to impose conditions inci-
dent to an order of reinstatement.4 A decade ago the legislature
took steps to remedy this situation by providing: "Employees
in the state or city civil service, who have been illegally dis-
charged from their employment, as found by the appellate
courts, shall be entitled to be paid by the employing agency all
salaries and wages withheld during the period of illegal separa-
tion, against which amount shall be credited and set-off all
wages and salaries earned by the employee in private employ-
ment in the period of separation." (Emphasis added.)5 In a
previous term our supreme court had considered and applied this
provision in a case in which the commission had found the em-
ployee's removal justified, but a court of appeal had reversed
and ordered the employee reinstated. The supreme court ordered
the judgment amended so as to give effect to the setoff provided
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 5(0)(3).
2. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1958-1959 Term
-Admtnistrative Law, 20 LA. L. REv. 268-71 (1960).
3. Hermann v. New Orleans Police Dep't, 238 La. 81, 113 So.2d 612 (1959).
4. Id.
5. LA. R.S. 49:113 (1960).
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by the legislature." In LeBlanc v. New Orleans Police Depart-
ment" the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal applied the provision
where the commission found the separation illegal and affirmed
the commission's action. It was argued that since a court had
not "found" the separation illegal the commission's deduction
was improper. The Fourth Circuit, however, took the plausible
view that the commission could make the deduction under its
constitutional conditioning power and that the later legislative
provision addressed to the courts empowered the courts to af-
firm a deduction by the commission even though such illegal
separation had not been "found by the appellate courts."s
The state Civil Service Commission, under its general rulemak-
ing powers with respect to classification plans, has proscribed cer-
tain activities, including the making of false statements with re-
gard to any application for rating.9 It has also provided that it shall
be the duty of every classified employee to assist the commission
and the department in the effective carrying out of constitutional
provisions and rules and to answer truthfully, whether under
oath or otherwise, all proper questions put by authorized repre-
sentatives of the department or the commission.' 0 In In re Tay-
lor" the First Circuit Court of Appeal addressed the issue of
whether a civil service employee violated the foregoing rules in
failing to report a fraudulent rating prepared by a superior and of
which the employee had knowledge as the result of preparing
papers incident thereto. The First Circuit held that there was no
duty under this rule to volunteer information to the commis-
sion concerning the fraud of a superior. 12 While such a duty,
were it within the power of the commission to create, would
greatly reduce the possibility of fraud, the present holding
leaves the revelations of fraud to commission audits and to anon-
ymous informers. The First Circuit said: "We doubt that it
was intended that every employee in the Civil Service be an
informer under penalty of dismissal or discipline or that they
6. Higgins v. Louisiana State Penitentiary, 245 La. 1009, 162 So.2d 343
(1964).
7. 231 So.2d 568 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970), disposing also of Thome v. New
Orleans Police Dep't, 231 So.2d 572 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970) and Parta v.
New Orleans Police Dep't, 231 So.2d 575 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
8. LeBlanc v. New Orleans police Dep't, 281 So.2d 568, 570-71 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1970).
9. Civ. SERv. R. 14.1.1(c).
10. Id. 14.1.1(f).
11. 233 So.2d 49 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
12. Id. at 53-54.
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be required to determine the legality or propriety of various
actions which might be taken by their superiors."'18
In Maggio v. Department of Public Safety14 the commission
had determined that the probationary period of "six months fol-
lowing appointment" commences when the employee's first pay
period begins.15 The First Circuit, however, noting that a pro-
bationary period was a work test period, concluded that there
could be no work test until the employee commences work.
Hence they plausibly held that the starting point of the pro-
bationary period must be the day on which the employee started
performance of the duties for which he was engaged.'
Under the civil service rules of the New Orleans Police De-
partment, "[i]f an employee of the police department is injured
directly in the performance of his duty for the protection of life
and property, the employee shall be granted additional sick
leave with pay, which shall not be charged against his ordinary
sick leave accumulation .... "17 In Blanchard v. New Orleans
Police Department'8 a patrolman contracted typhoid fever and
requested that he be accorded benefits under this provision on
the ground that the fever could only have been contracted dur-
ing an investigation conducted aboard a Chinese vessel in the
Port of New Orleans. Since no evidence could definitely deter-
mine where the patrolman contracted the virus, the commission
refused to make a finding of fact under this provision. However,
the commission also based its decision on the "hot pursuit" in-
terpretation of this provision, limiting such "pursuit" to the per-
formance of duties involving exposure of the policemen to extra-
ordinary danger in the protection of life and property. The pro-
vision as thus construed would not embrace any and every
injury or illness arising out of or in the scope of employment as
used in conjunction with workmen's compensation provisions,
but only those incurred in such "pursuits."'19 On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that this construction was too narrow
and that the provision was intended to be applicable to a patrol-
man "whenever he is carrying out the official orders or require-
13. Id. at 53.
14. 234 So.2d 844 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
15. Id. at 846.
16. Id.
17. NEw ORLEANS CIV. SERV. R. VIII, § 2.1(C).
18. 233 So.2d 716 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
19. Id. at 717.
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ments of his office."'20 The court also concluded that, while it
might not be possible to infer from the evidence that the disease
had been contracted on the Chinese vessel, lack of such a finding
could not be construed as a finding of fact that the patrolman
had not contracted the disease elsewhere in line of duty; hence
he might still be covered by the provision. On this basis the
court remanded the case to the commision for determination as
to whether, by a preponderance of the probabilities shown by
the record, the patrolman did or did not contract his illness while
on duty along the riverfront or on the Chinese vessel.21
In the 1968-1969 term the First Circuit reviewed the ad hoc
rulemaking procedures of the Louisiana State Penitenitary in
Guillory v. State, Department of Institutions22 and remanded a
case to the commission for the purpose of permitting a discharged
employee to prove a broader ad hoc rule was in effect at the
penitentiary, which conceivably would have mitigated his pen-
alty for an offense from outright discharge to transfer to other
institutional employment. Upon reconsideration this term, the
First Circuit has abandoned its earlier concern and concluded
that on such a rulemaking matter it should not inject itself into
the "disciplinary measures imposed by the appointing author-
ity. '28 A more satisfactory disposition of the matter might have
been a holding that the request for application of the mitigating
rule urged, contemplating a transfer of an incapacitated em-
ployee to some other form of duty, was untimely if raised only
as a defense to the serious dereliction of sleeping on duty at a
penitentiary. The right to request a transfer which could have
been exercised prior to the infraction, but was not, might be
deemed waived; such an analysis would have disposed of the
due process issue raised in the first decision.
The Louisiana Constitution empowers the Civil Service Com-
mission to make changes in classification plans but provides that
when changes are proposed there shall be reasonable oppor-
tunity to be heard afforded to affected employees. 24 Meaux v.
Department of Highways25 involved a proposal of the Depart-
20. Id.
21. Id. at 717-18.
22. 219 So.2d 282 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969), commented on at The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1968-1969 Term-Administrative Proce-
dure, 30 LA. L. REv. 263-65 (1970).
23. Guillory v. State, Dep't of Institutions, 234 So.2d 442, 444 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1970).
24. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 15(I).
25. 228 So.2d 680 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
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ment of Highways for work rules for bridge tenders based on
the number of bridge openings per month. The proposal was
prompted by civil service employees' protests that they were
being subjected to illegal work weeks. Pursuant to its powers
the commission received and approved the proposed work rules.
Despite such approval, the Department of Highways did not put
the rules into effect but instead fixed the hours on the basis of
the number of bridge tenders assigned to each bridge, maintain-
ig in a letter to the commission that this had been its intention
in its original request. It therefore requested the commission to
amend its approval accordingly. The commission approved the
rules by letter but afforded no opportunity to employees to be
heard on the matter.2 6 The Department of Highways was cen-
sured by the First Circuit and ordered to make appropriate pay
adjustments to comply with the original order since the proce-
dure followed was deemed in violation of employees' hearing
rights.2
The commission, pursuant to its constitutional rulemaking
power, has prescribed that in proceedings before it, "[t] he burden
of proof as to the facts shall be on the appellant in every appeal
and he shall be required to open the case."28 However, in Foster
v. Department of Public Welfare,2 9 an appeal to the First Circuit
some years ago where an employee testified denying charges on
which dismissal was based and counsel for the agency relied
solely upon the charges as constituting prima facie proof of
their validity, the court remanded the case for further proceed-
ings holding that where the discharged employee denied the
charges, and no evidence of alleged misconduct was introduced,
the discharge was illegal as a matter of law.29 The court also
made dicta statements that "although the burden as to the facts
is on appellant, such burden does not exist until such time as
the Commission places in the record some evidence to support
its findings of fact," and that "no duty evolved upon appellant
to prove the falsity of the charges ... until such time as there
is in the record at least some evidence of substantiation of the
charges."' 0 In Trotti v. Department of Public Safetyal the First
Circuit repudiated these dicta statements on the ground that they
26. Id. at 684-85.
27. Id. at 689.
28. LA. Cv. Simv. R. 13.19(c).
29. 144 So.2d 271 (La. App. 1st Or. 1962).
30. Id. at 275.
31. 234 So.2d 450 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
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were misleading and did violence to the express constitutional
provision relative to the burden of proof. The net result of the
Trotti holding is to permit the commission to maintain its pres-
ent procedure pursuant to which an employee opens his case
and offers his testimony in denial of the charges. If the agency
then puts on evidence sustaining the charges, the employee is
restricted to rebuttal of matters brought out by the appointing
agency during its presentation of evidence. However, the court,
concerned that counsel for the employee in the instant case had
in good faith relied upon the misleading dicta in Foster and had
fatally limited his employee client in initial testimony, remanded
the matter for the purpose of receiving and considering his re-
buttal testimony.82
Our supreme court stated in King v. Department of Public
Safety that in a dismissal case "if the evidence preponderately
shows that the appointing authority would not have taken the
disciplinary action except for political or religious reasons or
prejudices, it would be proper and, in keeping with the Commis-
sion's functions and duties, for it to reverse the ... disciplinary
action, provided it felt the assigned cause was not of such a
serious nature as to endanger the efficiency of the service."' ' In
Cormier v. Department of Institutions8 4 the commission refused
to hear testimony that a dismissal was based on political or
otherwise impure motives, stating that it was interested only in
evidence relating to charges in the letter of dismissal. The First
Circuit remanded for admission of such evidence, citing the
King decision and noting that failure to admit such evidence
constituted reversible error. On remand the commission heard
the evidence and ordered reinstatement of the employee, and,
on appeal, the First Circuit affirmed on. the merits.85
Department of Employment Security
The several circuits were as usual presented with an array
of mixed questions of law and fact from the Department of Em-
ployment Security. In disposing of one of them in Rankin v.
Doyal,8 6 the Second Circuit noted again that its judicial review was
32. Id. at 454-55.
33. 234 La. 409, 418, 100 So.2d 217, 220 (1958), commented upon In The
Work of the Lou.s4ana supreme Court for the 1957-1958 Term-Adminis-
trative Law, 19 LA. L. Rzv. 351, 354 (1959).
34. 212 So.2d 143 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
85. Cormier v. Board of Institutions, 230 So.2d 807 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
36. 223 So.2d 214, 217 (L. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
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statutorily limited to a determination of whether the facts found
by the board were supported by competent evidence and if so,
whether such facts as a matter of law justified the action taken.
In other cases the courts found no new questions of law pre-
sented and affirmed the department in all instances.3
A foray into the legislative history of the Unemployment
Security Act in Doyal v. Roosevelt Hotel" persuaded the Fourth
Circuit that it was not the intention of the legislature to include
tips or gratuities in remuneration for the purpose of determining
contributions by the employer and benefits to be received by the
employee. While tips and gratuities were specifically included
in the original 1936 Act within the definition of wages, they were
excluded in a 1948 amendment. 9 Thus while "remuneration" as
used in the Act could be interpreted to include such tips and
gratuities, it was the opinion of the court that it was the legis-
lative intent that they not be considered. 40
Structural Pest Control Commission
The courts of Louisiana have occasionally declared uncon-
stitutional occupational and professional licensing statutes on the
ground that they delegated power without reasonably clear stan-
dards or guides. Typical of such statutes was one creating a
Board of Watchmakers and delegating the power to that body
to license as watchmakers those who "possess such general edu-
cation, training and experience as the board may determine."
It was held invalid since there were neither guides for an exami-
nation of applicants nor any indication of the quality of per-
formance required from such applicants.41 A similar attack was
made this term in Pearce ex rel. Structural Pest Control Com-
mission v. Sharbino,42 on a statute authorizing a Structural Pest
Control Commission to administer examinations and license ap-
plicants. The legislature provided that "[a]ll applicants for ex-
amination for licenses must have a knowledge of the practical
and scientific facts underlying the practice of structural pest con-
trol. . . ...8 The provision was attacked by an operator who had
37. Id. Ball v. Administrator of the Div. of Employment Sec. of the Dep't
of Labor, 231 So.2d 470 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970); Jackson v. Doyal, 231 So.2d
462 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970), rehearing denied, Feb. 4, 1970.
38. 234 So.2d 510 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
39. Id. at 512-13.
40. Id. at 514-15.
41. State v. Morrow, 231 La. 572, 92 So.2d 70 (1956).
42. 254 La. 143, 223 So.2d 126 (1969).
43. LA. R.S. 40:1265A (1950).
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been practicing pest control without a license and against whom
the commission sought an injunction. The supreme court sus-
tained the statute against the attack by interpreting the require-
ment that applicants have certain designated knowledge as, in
effect, the creation of guides for an examination adequate to re-
move such examination from the unfettered discretion of the
commission." While the court conceded that the provision might
be construed as not directed to the commission, since somewhat
inartistically drawn, it nonetheless found it possible to uphold
the statute as an adequately limited delegation of authority.45
State Board of Medical Examiners
The Fourth Circuit had occasion during the 1969-1970 term
to approve an ingenious procedure for achieving enforcement
of license revocation by the State Board of Medical Examiners.
In Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners v. Heiman," al-
though consent judgment and injunction against engaging in the
practice of medicine had been obtained against a doctor, he none-
theless continued to do so. On a rule to show cause, the doctor
was warned of the consequences of not obeying the injunction;
on a second rule the doctor was held in contempt and sentenced
to one year in parish prison with 355 days of the sentence sus-
pended upon condition that he not engage in the practice of
medicine without having a valid certificate.47 The doctor attacked
the sentence on the ground that it went beyond the punishment
authorized for such violations; the statute only provides, in ad-
dition to an injunction, that the board may request a penalty of
$100.00 and attorneys fees of $50.00, with nothing provided as
to imprisonment.48 The court noted, however, that the trial judge
was not proceeding under the special statute but under the
general authority which the court has to punish for contempt.
Consequently it was limited only by the contempt statute which
authorizes it to impose fines of not more than $1,000.00 or im-
prisonment for not more than twelve months or both.49 Since
here the contempt punishment was primarily to gain future
acquiescence in the injunction against the practice of medicine,
44. Pearce ex rel. Structural Pest Control Comm'n v. Sharbino, 254 La.
143, 152, 223 So.2d 126, 129 (1969).
45. Id.
46. 230 So.2d 405 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
47. Id. at 406.
48. LA. R.S. 37:1286 (1950).
49. LA. CODS Civ. P. art. 224(2); LA. R.S. 13:4611 (1950).
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it would not seem improper to impose a suspended sentence con-
ditioned upon adherence to the injunction. A showing of viola-
tion of the condition would immediately precipitate revocation
of some or all of the suspension until adherence was in fact
achieved.
Louisiana Tax Commission
Our scheme of property taxation contemplates that assessors
will make the initial assessment and that after the rolls have
been exposed to the public, the police juries sitting as Boards of
Reviewers in each parish will review the work of the assessors
and make recommendations, to the tax commission concerning
appropriate increases or decreases in property valuation.5 The
tax commission thus is vested with final administrative authority
to fix and equalize such valuations. In the parish of Orleans, the
Board of Reviewers consists, not of a police jury, but of the
mayor and members of the city government, the Board of Asses-
sors, a member of the Board of Liquidation, a member of the
Sewage and Water Board and the president of Orleans Parish
School Board.61
In City of New Orleans v. Comiskey 2 the city, unhappy with
the work of the assessors, sought a writ of mandamus to compel
assessors in the parish to assess real estate uniformly and at its
actual cash value. The Fourth Circuit ruled that the city was
not entitled to a writ of mandamus since it had not yet exhausted
the administrative remedies available to it; as "an interested
party" within the statute, it should appear before the Board of
Reviewers and petition that body for relief.5 8 The court also
held that it was within the power of the Board of Reviewers not
only to make recommendations with respect to specific assess-
ments but also recommendations to the tax commission with
respect to general practices of assessment. 4 Presumably, only
after the Board of Reviewers has failed to make requested rec-
ommendations to the tax commission or the tax commission has
failed to act thereon would the city have exhausted its adminis-
trative remedies and be eligible for judicial relief.55
50. LA. R.S. 47:1995-96 (1950).
51. LA. R.S. 47:1931 (1950).
52. 232 So.2d 840 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970), rehearing denied, April 6, 1970.
53. Id. at 842.
54. Id. at 843.
55. Since officials of the city are members of the Board of Reviewers,
presumably a minority report could be filed In the event the Board of Re-
viewers refused to make requested recommendations to the tax commission.
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In the event of unfavorable action by the tax commission
the question arises as to what would be the position of the city,
since it is not a taxpayer within the provisions permitting judi-
cial review?5 Also mandamus might be refused on the ground
that it was an attempt to order discretionary action.57 Would the
city have a remedy within the provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act, since that Act provides that "[a] person who is
aggrieved by a final decision or order in an adjudication proceed-
ing is entitled to judicial review"?8 While the act speaks only
of review of adjudication, this limitation should not be an ob-
stacle since the proceedings before the Board of Reviewers and
before the tax commission are in the nature of class adjudica-
tion. As the proponent of the position that actual cash values and
uniform assessment had not in fact been the criteria applied, the
city would have the burden of proof to show this by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. In the absence of controverting evidence by
the assessors, the recommended decision by the Board of Re-
viewers should be appropriate adjustment in the assessments.
After administrative review and final decision by the tax com-
mission, it would appear that the matter was ripe for judicial
review under the provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act.59
The limitations of mandamus as a device for reviewing the
action of the tax commission were underscored in Karno v.
Louisiana Tax Commission.60 A taxpayer there sought the writ
to command the tax commission to approve tax rolls as sub-
mitted by the tax assessor of Jefferson Parish. The court refused
to issue the writ since this would have eliminated the discretion
with which the tax commission is charged in performing its
duties to fix and equalize valuations and generally review the
assessment rolls.61 In this case informal intervention in parish
assessments had begun early in the tax year when the tax com-
mission, of its own motion, and on the basis of informally ob-
tained information, wrote assessors notifying them that because
of a number of complaints from individual taxpayers and one
or more officials, and because of its own belief that the ratio
56. LA. R.S. 47:1998 (1950).
57. Bee note 60 infra and accompanying text.
58. LA. R.S. 49:964 (Supp. 1967).
59. Id.
60. 233 So.2d 592 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970), rehear4ng den4ed, March 9,
1970.
61. Id. at 598.
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between assessments and market value in the parish were gen-
erally lower than most other parishes in the state, it would not
accept any 1969 assessments that were less than the 1968 assess-
ments of such properties.6 2 Disagreement then developed within
the tax commission, the upshot of which was that the chairman
of the tax commission, without the acquiescence of any other
board members, directed that the tax rolls be exposed to the
public.1 Some months later, however, when the tax rolls were
actually filed with the tax commission, the full commission re-
fused to approve the assessments until the 1969 reduced assess-
ments were restored to the 1968 level.6 4 The instant mandamus
proceeding followed. Instead of seeking to mandamus the tax
commission into filing the rolls as submitted, had the taxpayer
waited for the final action by the tax commission fixing the
value of the taxable property in the parish of Jefferson, it would
seem to have been in a position to request judicial review as "a
person aggrieved by a final decision or order in an adjudication
proceeding" under the Administrative Procedure Act.6 5
School Boards
In Campo v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board," a pro-
ceeding in the nature of mandamus in which a demoted school
teacher sought to be reinstated and reimbursed for loss of pay,
the transcript of the hearing before the school board was not
introduced in evidence before the trial judge until after a prelimi-
nary default judgment against the school board had been taken
and confirmation thereof was sought. The trial judge did not
examine the transcript. The school board filed application for a
new trial on the ground that the default judgment was rendered
without review of the record before the school board; therefore,
the dismissed school teacher had failed to establish a prima facie
case to support the judgment as required by the Louisiana Code
of Civil Proceudre. A new trial was not granted and the school
board appealed. The First Circuit noted that the Tenure Act61
granted a full judicial hearing to review the action of the school
board and that this contemplated not a trial but a review of the
action of the school board on its record, which here had not
62, Id. at 594.
63. Id. at 594-95.
64. 1d. at 595.
65. LA. R.S. 49:964 (Supp. 1967).
66. 231 So.2d 67 (La App. 1st Cir. 1970).
67. L.A. R.S. 17:443 (1950).
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been had. On this basis the court remanded the case to the trial
court.6 8 The case should be compared with Lewing v. DeSoto
Parish School Board9 where our supreme court not only ruled
that the case must be submitted on the record as made before
the school board but that no additional evidence could be in-
troduced by the school board. The court noted that a full hearing
at the district court level was provided for the protection of
permanent school teachers and that such provision confined the
school board to the record on which it had acted unless the dis-
charged teacher chose to introduce additional evidence in her
behalf; only in such an event would the school board have an
opportunity to adduce additional evidence.70 It is thus not en-
tirely accurate to say, as the First Circuit did, that the district
court acts only as an appellate court. Rather it acts as an ap-
pellate court insofar as the school board is concerned but as a
trial court to the extent of permitting the discharged school
teacher to introduce additional evidence in her behalf.,1 The
procedure is reminiscent of that evolved by Congress in con-
nection with the review of ICC reparation orders at the behest
of the railroad; the hybrid procedure there was a response, in
part, to the threat of unconstitutionality on the basis of depriving
a person of a common-law jury trial.72 No such threat would
seem to warrant this hybrid procedure in school board cases.
Except for newly discovered evidence, it would seem appro-
priate and more efficient to require the discharged teacher to
adduce all of her evidence at the level of the school board pro-
ceeding, with judicial review confined to the record so made.
Miscellaneous Licensing and Zoning Matters
In Gulf Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Sehrt,78 a
proceeding attacking the licensing of five new savings and loan
branches in Jefferson Parish, the First Circuit took the posi-
tion that an error in pleading, combining summary and ordinary
process, could properly be corrected without beginning over.
68. Campo v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 231 So.2d 67, 73 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1970).
69. 238 La. 43, 113 So.2d 462 (1959), commented upon in The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1958-1959 Term-Administrative Law, 20
IA. L. REv. 268, 275-76 (1960).
70. Lewing v. DeSoto Parish School Bd., 238 La. 43, 52, 113 So.2d 462,
465 (1959).
71. Campo v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 231 So.2d 67, 71
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
72. Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 382, § 5, 25 Stat. 855, 861.
73. 233 So.2d 268 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970), rehearing denied, April 13, 1970.
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After the licenses had been granted, a competing institution and
certain others instituted a suit in the nature of injunction re-
questing that a rule be issued to the Banking Commissioner
directing him to show cause "why he should not forthwith sus-
pend the operation of the approvals and permits issued" on the
basis of illegality in their issuance.74 The trial court was per-
suaded that the plaintiffs were asking for mandatory relief
requiring the use of ordinary process rather than the summary
process authorized in respect to show cause orders.75 The First
Circuit took the view that since the plaintiff had coupled with
his request for mandatory relief a petition for review of the
legality of the commissioner's licensing order (in that he had
failed to consider factors specifically required to be considered)
the action was one by ordinary process. As a consequence, while
the rule to show cause was properly vacated, the plaintiffs should
have been permitted to proceed with their suit requesting judi-
cial review of the legality of the licensing.76
Rather interestingly, the trial judge had overruled an excep-
tion of no right of action based on the lack of standing of the
competing savings and loan association plaintiffs and, at the
same time, had dismissed the intervention of the new branch
charter holders. It could be inferred from the overruling of
the exception of no right of action that the trial judge deemed
plaintiff to be a "person aggrieved" within the Administrative
Procedure Act and that the savings and loan associations, having
received their charters, were not persons aggrieved and not en-
titled to intervention. But it is also to be noted that this provision
of the Administrative Procedure Act provides that such relief is
granted "without limiting, however, utilization of or the scope
of judicial review available under other means of review, re-
dress, relief or trial de novo provided by law." 8 The First Circuit
did not refer to the Act but nevertheless ruled that these inter-
ventions should not have been dismissed because the intervenors
were indispensable parties who possess rights materially affected
and whose right to intervention is provided by the Code of Civil
Procedure.79
74. Id. at 269.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 270.
77. Id. at 270-71.
78. LA. R.S. 49:964 (Supp. 1967).
79. Gulf Fed. Say. & Loan AEs'n v. Sehrt, 233 So.2d 268, 271 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1970).
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A Jefferson Parish ordinance, recently interpreted by the
Fourth Circuit in Roberts v. Jefferson Parish Council,80 per-
mitted restaurants to operate in areas zoned "C-1" but did not
permit the operation of barrooms, nightclubs or lounges-such
establishments requiring a "C-2" zoning. The ordinance defined
a restaurant as "a retail establishment offering food or beverage
or both for consumption on the premises. Restaurants include
cafeterias."81 The parish planning director interpreted the ordi-
nance as permitting a bar or lounge to operate in conjunction
with a resturant in a "C-i" classification; as long as it was so
operated it was ruled that it could take the form of a sit down
type bar, piano bar or service bar. 2 Although temporary permits
were issued to an operator on the assumption that there would
be compliance with this interpretation, a permanent permit was
later refused on the ground that the operation was actually a
barroom, nightclub or lounge requiring "C-2" zoning.8 Nonethe-
less, the trial judge enjoined the parish from closing the lounge
for violation of the zoning ordinance; on appeal his order was
affirmed on the basis that "while the facility was primarily a
lounge or nightclub it was also clear that the food sales formed
a substantial part of the operation."8 4
The case offers an interesting illustration of what can hap-
pen when the judiciary pays insufficient attention to the expertise
of the agency immediately charged with administering zoning
ordinances. In Roberts, it seems reasonably clear that the ordi-
nance was designed to permit in "C-i" zoning a bar serving
primarily as a waiting area preliminary to being seated at a
restaurant table and as a source of drinks served at restaurant
tables before and during the course of a meal. With an inter-
pretation of a zoning ordinance which permits compliance to
be achieved by a showing that a substantial quantity of food is
served in the bar or lounge, a ready means is provided for defeat-
ing the purpose of the zoning.85
Our licensing provisions for the retail or wholesale sale of
beer contain the salutary requirement that applications for both
80. 235 So.2d 131 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970), rehearing denied, June 1, 1970.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 132.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 132-33.
85. The Fourth Circuit thought it "irrelevant" that at the trial consider-
able attention was paid to whether "this was a bar operated in connection
with a restaurant, or, on the other hand, a restaurant operated in conjunc-
tion with a bar." Id.
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state and local permits must be made within twenty-four hours
of each other, presumably for the purpose of avoiding the use of
leverage from the granting of one to obtain the other. Failure to
comply may result in denial of the application. Since the lan-
guage is not mandatory, however, it appears that such a failure
may be waived by the licensing authority.86 Recent litigation be-
fore the Third Circuit confirms this implication; in Rawls Dis-
tributing, Inc. v. Vernon Parish Police Jury 7 a police jury which
granted a license but withheld its issuance because the applicant
had failed to comply with the dual filing requirements was or-
dered to issue the license. Presumably the police jury might have
refused to grant the license but, having done so and not having
rescinded its action within the statutory period for acting on
the application, it could not refuse to issue the license on the
basis of a failure of compliance.8
In the recent case of Talbert v. Planning Commission89 zon-
ing was under attack on the ground that applicants had failed
to have the change recommended by the proper commission,
having erroneously addressed their application to the planning
commission. Thus it was argued that when the city council ap-
proved the change in zoning on the basis of a recommendation
from the planning commission, it was acting on the recommen-
dation of the wrong body and contrary to the city ordinances. A
peremptory exception of no cause of action was sustained by the
trial judge. Analysis of the statutes and ordinances by the First
Circuit indicated identical personnel for both the planning and
zoning commissions but with differing responsibilities; in these
circumstances, the exception was overruled and the matter was
remanded for trial on the merits.90 It is of interest that, while
application was made to the planning commission, it is possible
that appropriate zoning criteria were applied by the commission
despite the erroneous entitlement of the application. If the plan-
ning-zoning commission did properly apply zoning criteria in
the course of making its recommendation, no reversible error
would seem to have occurred and the city council would have
acted on the basis of a recommendation correct as to substance.
86. LA. R.S. 26:278 (1950).
87. 234 So.2d 480 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
88. LA. R.S. 26:283A (1950). The statute provides that "It]he decision to
withhold a local permit shall be made within thirty-five calendar days of
the filing of an application." It is not clear why the action to rescind was
not timely here, since the application was filed May 12 and the rescinding
action was taken on June 14, a period of 34 days,
89. 230 So.2d 920 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
90. Id. at 924-25.
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